Fix printf problems with high ascii characters after r413586 (1.8).

In r413586 (1.8) various casts were added to silence gcc 4.10 warnings.
Those fixes included things like:

    -out += sprintf(out, "%%%02X", (unsigned char) *ptr);
    +out += sprintf(out, "%%%02X", (unsigned) *ptr);

That works for low ascii characters, but for the high range that yields
e.g. FFFFFFC3 when C3 is expected.

This changeset:
- fixes those casts to use the 'hh' unsigned char modifier instead
- consistently uses %02x instead of %2.2x (or other non-standard usage)
- adds a few 'h' modifiers in various places
- fixes a 'replcaes' typo
- dev/urandon typo (in 13+ patch)

Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/4263/

ASTERISK-24619 #close
Reported by: Stefan27 (on IRC)
........

Merged revisions 429673 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11
........

Merged revisions 429674 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12
........

Merged revisions 429675 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/13


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@429683 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3

6 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/main/http.c b/main/http.c
index 40615169c..a9e50cbc2 100644
--- a/main/http.c
+++ b/main/http.c
@@ -1030,8 +1030,8 @@ static int http_body_check_chunk_sync(struct ast_tcptls_session_instance *ser)
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (chunk_sync[0] != 0x0D || chunk_sync[1] != 0x0A) {
-		ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "HTTP chunk sync bytes wrong (0x%02X, 0x%02X)\n",
-			(unsigned) chunk_sync[0], (unsigned) chunk_sync[1]);
+		ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "HTTP chunk sync bytes wrong (0x%02hhX, 0x%02hhX)\n",
+			(unsigned char) chunk_sync[0], (unsigned char) chunk_sync[1]);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/main/loader.c b/main/loader.c
index def8bba2a..f80e72634 100644
--- a/main/loader.c
+++ b/main/loader.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int printdigest(const unsigned char *d)
 	char buf[256]; /* large enough so we don't have to worry */
 
 	for (pos = 0, x = 0; x < 16; x++)
-		pos += sprintf(buf + pos, " %02x", (unsigned)*d++);
+		pos += sprintf(buf + pos, " %02hhx", *d++);
 
 	ast_debug(1, "Unexpected signature:%s\n", buf);
 
diff --git a/main/manager.c b/main/manager.c
index ce0f61dd9..a4ad0563d 100644
--- a/main/manager.c
+++ b/main/manager.c
@@ -3212,7 +3212,7 @@ static int authenticate(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 			MD5Update(&md5, (unsigned char *) user->secret, strlen(user->secret));
 			MD5Final(digest, &md5);
 			for (x = 0; x < 16; x++)
-				len += sprintf(md5key + len, "%2.2x", (unsigned)digest[x]);
+				len += sprintf(md5key + len, "%02hhx", digest[x]);
 			if (!strcmp(md5key, key)) {
 				error = 0;
 			} else {
diff --git a/main/udptl.c b/main/udptl.c
index 89ea0a88e..d8b02b023 100644
--- a/main/udptl.c
+++ b/main/udptl.c
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static int udptl_rx_packet(struct ast_udptl *s, uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len)
 #if 0
 			fprintf(stderr, "FEC: ");
 			for (j = 0; j < s->rx[x].fec_len[i]; j++)
-				fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", data[j]);
+				fprintf(stderr, "%02hhX ", data[j]);
 			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
 		}
diff --git a/main/utils.c b/main/utils.c
index e3bb36e03..7032631f8 100644
--- a/main/utils.c
+++ b/main/utils.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ void ast_md5_hash(char *output, const char *input)
 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
 	ptr = output;
 	for (x = 0; x < 16; x++)
-		ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%2.2x", (unsigned)digest[x]);
+		ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02hhx", digest[x]);
 }
 
 /*! \brief Produce 40 char SHA1 hash of value. */
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void ast_sha1_hash(char *output, const char *input)
 	SHA1Result(&sha, Message_Digest);
 	ptr = output;
 	for (x = 0; x < 20; x++)
-		ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%2.2x", (unsigned)Message_Digest[x]);
+		ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02hhx", Message_Digest[x]);
 }
 
 /*! \brief Produce a 20 byte SHA1 hash of value. */
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ char *ast_uri_encode(const char *string, char *outbuf, int buflen, struct ast_fl
 			if (out - outbuf >= buflen - 3) {
 				break;
 			}
-			out += sprintf(out, "%%%02X", (unsigned) *ptr);
+			out += sprintf(out, "%%%02hhX", (unsigned char) *ptr);
 		} else {
 			*out = *ptr;	/* Continue copying the string */
 			out++;
@@ -2701,10 +2701,10 @@ char *ast_eid_to_str(char *s, int maxlen, struct ast_eid *eid)
 		}
 	} else {
 		for (x = 0; x < 5; x++) {
-			sprintf(s, "%02x:", (unsigned)eid->eid[x]);
+			sprintf(s, "%02hhx:", eid->eid[x]);
 			s += 3;
 		}
-		sprintf(s, "%02x", (unsigned)eid->eid[5]);
+		sprintf(s, "%02hhx", eid->eid[5]);
 	}
 	return os;
 }
diff --git a/main/uuid.c b/main/uuid.c
index ba864ac71..3c5d7afd4 100644
--- a/main/uuid.c
+++ b/main/uuid.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void generate_uuid(struct ast_uuid *uuid)
 	 * or /dev/urandom not existing on systems in this age is next to none.
 	 */
 
-	/* XXX Currently, we only protect this call if the user has no /dev/urandon on their system.
+	/* XXX Currently, we only protect this call if the user has no /dev/urandom on their system.
 	 * If it turns out that there are issues with UUID generation despite the presence of
 	 * /dev/urandom, then we may need to make the locking/unlocking unconditional.
 	 */